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LETTERS OF CREDIT: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
OF DOCUMENTARY COMPLIANCE
INTRODUCTION
The letter of credit is a payment mechanism whereby an obligation
of payment or performance is assured by substituting a stable credit
source for the potential financial instability of the promisor.' The
letter is the third agreement in a transactional sequence that is initially
comprised of two independent contracts. 2 The first contract is be-
tween the customer, the person applying for the letter of credit,3 and
1. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir.
1979) (per curiam); Intraworld Indus. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 357, 336
A.2d 316, 323 (1975); H. Harfield, Bank Credits and Acceptances 29-31 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as H. Harfield I]; H. Harfield, Letters of Credit 1-2 (1979) [herein-
after cited as H. Harfield II]; 1 A. Lowenfeld, International Private Trade §§ 5.1,
5.3 (1977); Kozolchyk, Letters of Credit, in 9 International Encyclopedia of Com-
parative Law ch. 5, at 3, 139 (1979). A letter of credit can be either revocable or
irrevocable in nature. See U.C.C. § 5-106 (1977); Int'l Chamber of Commerce,
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) art. I(A) (Publ. No.
290 rev. ed. 1974) (effective Oct. 1, 1975) [hereinafter cited as U.C.P.]. Rarely
issued, a revocable letter of credit can be cancelled or modified at will by the issuer.
U.C.C. § 5-106(3) (1977); U.C.P. art. 2 (1974). The irrevocable letter of credit is a
binding engagement by the issuer that, once established, requires consent, U.C.C. §
5-106(2) (1977); U.C.P. art. 3(c) (1974), and a writing, U.C.C. § 5-104(1) (1977), to
be cancelled or amended. One district court has labelled the revocable letter of credit
as "an illusory contract." West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp.
1107, 1111 (W.D. Pa. 1976); accord U.C.C. § 5-106 official comment 2 (1977): H.
Harfield II, supra, at 15-16. Under the UCP, in the absence of any indication of
revocability, "the credit shall be deemed to be revocable." U.C.P. art. 1(c); see
Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133, 1137-38 (N.D. I11.
1976). The UCC expressly ignores the issue and "intentionally [leaves it] to the courts
for decision in the" light of the facts and general law." U.C.C. § 5-103 official
comment 1 (1977); see West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107,
1112 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (reasoning that the thrust of Article 5 requires construing letter
as irrevocable).
2. East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 593 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir.
1979); Baker v. National Boulevard Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Iil. 1975);
Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations, 94 Banking L.J. 424, 425
(1977); Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit (pt. 1), 25 Stan. L.
Rev. 716, 719 (1973); see, e.g., Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481
F.2d 1224, 1239 n.21 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); First
Nat'l Bank v. Wynne, 149 Ga. App. 811, 814, 256 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1979); Colorado
Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 36 (Colo. 1981) (en bane),
3. A customer is defined as "a buyer or other person who causes an issuer to
issue a credit. The term also includes a bank which procures issuance or confirmation
on behalf of that bank's customer." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(g) (1977). By nature of the
customer-bank relationship, the customer has been found an indispensable party to
an action for injunctive relief against an issuer. Edgewater Constr. Co. v. Percy
Wilson Mtge. & Fin. Corp., 44 Ill. App. 3d 220, 227-28, 357 N.E.2d 1307, 1313-14
(1976).
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the beneficiary, the party to whom the letter of credit is issued. 4 This
contract usually involves a promise by the customer to pay a certain
sum of money to the beneficiary s incident to either a sales transaction
or a service contract.'
4. A beneficiary is defined as "'a person who is entitled under [the letter of
credit] to draw or demand payment." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(d) (1977): see H. Harfield
II, supra note 1, at 12.
5. See H. Harfield II, supra note 1, at 1.
6. See J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform
Commercial Code § 18-1, at 708-09 (2d ed. 1980). The utility of the letter of credit as
a stable payment mechanism is well evidenced by the evolution of diverse usages
outside the area of commercial sales transactions. See Armstrong. The Letter of
Credit as a Lending Device in a Tight Money Market. 22 Bus. Law. 1105, 1105
(1967); Murray, Letters of Credit in Non-Sale of Goods Transactions. 30 Bus. Law.
1103, 1103-05 (1975); Comment, Commercial Letters of Credit: Derelopinent and
Expanded Uses In Modern Commercial Transactions, 4 Cum.-Sam. L. Rev. 134, 135
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Letters of Credit]: Comment, Recent Extensions in the
Use of Commercial Letters of Credit, 66 Yale L.J. 902, 902 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as Recent Extensions]. See generally J. White & R. Summers, supra. § 18-1, at 70S-10
(outlining various uses of letter of credit). The most utilized alternative type of credit
is the standby letter of credit. A standby letter is defined as "any letter of credit...
which represents an obligation to the beneficiary on the part of the issuer . . . to
make payment on account of any indebtedness undertaken by the account party, or
. . . to make payment on account of any default by the account party in the
performance of an obligation." 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160(a) (1981). Similar definitions
have been stated by the Federal Reserve Board, id. § 208.8(d), and by the FDIC. Id.
§ 337.2(a). Under a standby letter, the issuer is obligated to honor a demand for
payment when there has been a failure of performance in the underlying transaction.
See Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, app. A,
at 1081 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (adopting memorandum decision of lower
court); Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C. L.J.
251, 258 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Harfield III]. The standby letter differs from a
guarantee in that the issuer's obligation to the beneficiary under the letter is primary
and, therefore, not triggered by the customer's inability to pay. Barclays Bank
D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dis-
missed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); United Bank v. Quadrangle, Ltd., 42 Colo. App. 486,
487-88, 596 P.2d 408, 409 (1979): Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578
S.W.2d 109, 114 (Tex. 1978). Furthermore, issuance of a guarantee is beyond the
power of a national bank. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980): see Kimen v. Atlas
Exch. Nat'l Bank, 92 F.2d 615, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 650
(1938); Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the Standby Letter of Credit Controversy,
96 Banking L.J. 46, 62 (1979). The standby letter of credit has been adopted for use
in a wide variety of financing situations. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 172 (3d Cir. 1979) (substitute for appeal bond):
National Sur. Corp. v. Midland Bank, 551 F.2d 21, 23-24 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(substitute for performance bond); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d
882, 884 (3d Cir. 1977) (used for long-term financing): Beathard v. Chicago Football
Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133, 1135 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (guarantee of salary payment):
West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1108.09 (W.D. Pa.
1976) (collateral for loan). A "notice of default" is expressly included as a type of
documentary draft, thus bringing the standby letter of credit within the scope of
Article 5. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(b) (1977).
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The second contract is formed between the customer and a bank, or
issuer.7  The customer applies for the letter of credit, specifies the
terms and conditions of the letter8 and promises to reimburse the
issuer upon honor of the beneficiary's draft. 9 The issuer's right to
reimbursement is conditioned upon its "duly honoring" the draft. 0
When the beneficiary submits the draft," it must comply with the
terms and conditions supplied by the customer in its contract with the
issuer.1 2 Further, if the documents tendered by the seller comply, the
7. The "issuer" is defined as "a bank or other person issuing a credit." U.C.C. §
5-103(1)(c) (1977). The issuer's obligations to the customer are detailed in id. § 5-109,
and the obligations owed the beneficiary in id. § 5-114. National banks are empow-
ered to issue both commercial and financial letters of credit. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1160,
208.8(d) (1981).
8. Anglo-South Am. Trust Co. v. Uhe, 261 N.Y. 150, 156, 184 N.E. 741, 742-43
(1933); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-4, at 722; see, e.g., H. Harfield I,
supra note 1, at 310-11 (model application form); 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra note 1,
supp. at 207 (same). See generally 3 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 5-
101:7 (1971) (discussing an issuer's right to refuse a customer's application for issue of
a letter of credit).
9. The Code expressly provides for reimbursement unless otherwise agreed.
U.C.C. § 5-114(3) (1977); accord U.C.P. art. 8(b) (1974); 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016(c)
(1980); H. Harfield II, supra note 1, at 49-50.
10. U.C.C. § 5-114(3) & official comment 3 (1977). An issuer duly honors a draft
where the documents facially comply or where the issuer is privileged to pay, even
though the customer has alleged fraud in the transaction. Id. official comment 3; see
Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, app. A at
1081 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (adopting memorandum decision of lower court);
Dynamics Corp. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995-96 (N.D. Ga.
1973).
11. As defined in U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(b) (1977), "[a] 'documentary draft' or a
'documentary demand for payment' is one honor of which is conditioned upon the
presentation of a document or documents. 'Document' means any paper including
document of title, security, invoice, certificate, notice of default and the like." Id.
The term documentary draft was intended by the drafters to be construed in an
extremely broad fashion. See id. § 5-103 official comment 2; see, e.g., First Am. Nat'l
Bank v. Alcorn, Inc., 361 So. 2d 481, 487 (Miss. 1978) (invoice held to be a "docu-
mentary draft"); Marfa Nat'l Bank v. Powell, 512 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974) (bill of sale held to be a doumentary draft). But see Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine
Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311, 318 & n.9 (Me. 1978) (written notice of default not a
"documentary draft").
12. See Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 46-
48 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1979); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d
171, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1979); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank,
528 F.2d 802, 805-06 (4th Cir. 1975); International Leather Distribs. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 464 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 & n.9 (S.D.N.Y.), aJJ'd, 607 F.2d
996 (2d Cir. 1979); AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-American Sports
Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 223 (D. Ariz. 1978); It's Devine Indus. v. Bank Leumi
Trust Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 130, 131-32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977);
U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977).
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issuer "must" pay; 13 no interference from the customer is allowed.' 4
The letter of credit is thus an "engagement"' 5 by the issuer to the
beneficiary, on account of the customer, to support the customer's
agreement to pay money under the customer-beneficiary contract.',
It is a basic tenet of letter of credit law that the issuer is concerned
exclusively with the documents required to satisfy the conditions of
the letter, not the performance obligations created by the customer-
beneficiary contract. 17 The issuer's entire engagement is contained in
13. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977); e.g., Pringle-Associated Mtge. Corp. v. Southern
Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1978); Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union
Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, app. A at 1081 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(adopting memorandum decision of lower court): AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v.
Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 223 (D. Ariz. 1978);
Baker v. National Boulevard Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. I11. 1975);
Schweibish v. Pontchartrain State Bank, 389 So. 2d 731, 734-35 (La. Ct. App. 1980):
CNA Mtge. Investors, Ltd. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank. 540 S.W.2d 238, 242-43 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1975).
14. U.C.C. § 5-114 official comment 1 (1977). "The duty of the issuer to honor
where there is factual compliance with the terms of the credit is ... independent of
any instructions from its customer once the credit has been issued and received by the
beneficiary." Id. This rule may not be varied by contractual agreement. Id. § 5-
114(1) official comment 1; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-2, at 711. The
customer, however, may seek to enjoin honor of the beneficiary's draft when there is
"fraud in the transaction." U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (1977). Because the letter of credit is
totally separate from the underlying contract, courts require active fraud that "viti-
ate[s] the entire transaction" before an injunction will be granted. Intraworld Indus.
v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 359, 336 A.2d 316, 324-25 (1975): see United
Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 260-61, 360 N.E.2d
943, 949-50, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270-71 (1976), Sztejn v. 1. Henry Schroder Banking
Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (1941); see also Harfield, Enjoining
Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 Banking L.J. 596, 596 (1978) (injunctions against
honor should only issue when the fraud is intentional and egregious); Note, Judicial
Development of Letter of Credit Law: A Reappraisal, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 144, 165
(1981) (advocating legislative guidance in the area of injunctions to establish a
uniform standard of application) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Developmnt].
15. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a) (1977); see Baker v. National Boulevard Bank, 399 F.
Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
16. See Pringle-Associated Mtge. Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871,
874 (5th Cir. 1979); Venizelos S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65
(2d Cir. 1970); West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1109-12
(W.D. Pa. 1976); Baker v. National Boulevard Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D.
Ill. 1975); Dynamics Corp. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995 (N.D.
Ga. 1973).
17. U.C.P. art 8(c) (1974). U.C.C. § 5-114 official comment 1 (1977) states that
"[t]he letter of credit is essentially a contract between the issuer and the beneficiary
and is recognized by this Article as independent of the underlying contract between
the customer and the beneficiary." Id. The overwhelming majority of courts have
interpreted this language to require total separation of the letter of credit from the
underlying transaction. See, e.g., KM\V Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d
10, 16 (2d Cir. 1979); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 885 (3d
Cir. 1977); Fidelity Bank v. Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co., 465 F.2d 211, 214 (10th
1982]
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the terms of the letter. 8 Thus, the letter of credit must always be
conceptualized as an entity unto itself;' 9 the bank is neither obliged
nor licensed to concern itself with the actual operation of the underly-
ing transaction. 20
Total insulation of the letter of credit was designed to facilitate the
absolute certainty required in the letter arrangement.2' To involve
the issuer in any of the myriad of performance problems in the under-
lying transaction would frustrate the definite nature of the payment
promise.22 Letter of credit insulation emphasizes that performance
under a letter is entirely a "paper" transaction.2 3
Cir. 1972); Decor by Nikkei Int'l v. Federal Rep. of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893, 907
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marquette National Bank, 419 F. Supp. 734,
736 (D. Minn. 1976); West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107,
1114 (W.D. Pa. 1976); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
173 Conn. 492, 497-99, 378 A.2d 562, 566 (1977); First Nat'l Bank v. Rosebud Houis.
Auth., 291 N.W.2d 41, 46 (Iowa 1980); Maurice O'Meara v. National Park Bank,
239 N.Y. 386, 395-96, 146 N.E. 636, 639 (1925). See generally H. Harfield I, supra
note 1, at 107 (analysis of the "fundamental proposition" that the issuer is immune
from the underlying transaction).
18. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir.
1962); see Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 805-
06 (4th Cir. 1975); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32,
36-37 (Colo. 1981) (en bane); U.C.C. § 5-109 (1977).
19. Joseph, Letters of Credit: The Developing Concepts and Financing Func-
tions, 94 Banking L.J. 816, 850-51 (1977); see authorities cited supra note 17.
20. See U.C.C. § 5-109(1)(a) (1977). Under the UCP, valid performance of the
letter of credit is determined "on the basis of the documents alone." U.C.P. art. 8(c)
(1974). The issuer, therefore, may not raise defenses available to either party in the
underlying transactions. See, e.g., East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1979); Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union
Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, app. A at 1081-82 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(adopting memorandum decision of lower court); Cappaert Enters. v. Citizens & S.
Int'l Bank, 486 F. Supp. 819, 826 (E.D. La. 1980).
21. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d
Cir. 1979); Pringle-Associated Mtge. Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871,
874 (5th Cir. 1978); Far E. Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F.
Supp. 193, 195 (S.D. Ohio 1977); cf. Asociacion De Azucareros De Guatemala v.
United States Nat'l Bank, 423 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that -[i]n the
interests of certainty and stability," a bilateral modification of the underlying agree-
ment has no effect on the letter of credit).
22. In the influential case of Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239
N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925), the court held that allowing or requiring a bank to
monitor performance of the underlying agreement "would impose upon a bank a
duty which in many cases would defeat the primary purpose of such letters of credit.
This primary purpose is an assurance to the seller of merchandise of prompt payment
against documents." Id. at 397, 146 N.E. at 639; accord Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v.
North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 805 (4th Cir. 1975); see Pringle-Associated
Mtge. Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1978); Far E.
Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 195 (S.D. Ohio
1977).
23. See Sisalcords do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasileira De Sisal, S.A., 450 F.2d
419, 422 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase
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Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) governs per-
formance in letter of credit transactions. -4  Three states adopted a
version of the Code which provides that the Uniform Customs and
Practices for Commercial Documentary Credits (UCP)2- would con-
trol letter of credit transactions "'unless otherwise agreed." '-2  The
UCP is a codification of custom, not a code of law. 27  It does, how-
Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1970): Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1962): U.C.C. § 5-114(l) (1977):
U.C.P. art. 8(a) (1974).
24. See U.C.C. §§ 5-101, 5-102(1) (1977). Code treatment of letters of credit is
the ultimate exercise of freedom of contract: the phrase -'unless otherwise agreed"
appears fifteen times in the provisions of Article 5. J. White & R. Summers, supra
note 6, § 18-3, at 717. See generally Vorks, Otherwise Agreed and Article Fire: An
Exercise in Freedom of Contract, 11 St. Louis U. L.J. 416 (1967). The majority of
provisions are "gap fillers" to be taken into account anywhere the parties did not
provide for a contrary or additional requirement in their agreement. See U.C.C. § 5-
106 (1977) (establishment of credit): id. § 5-107 (advise of credit and confirmation):
id. § 5-109 (issuer obligation to the customer): id. § 5-110 (availability of credit): id.
§ 5-111 (warranties); id. § 5-113 (indemnities): id. § 5-114 (issuer's duty to honor):
Works, supra, at 422.
25. Created and published by the International Chamber of Commerce in 1930,
the UCP has undergone numerous revisions. H. Harfield II. supra note 1, at 3.
Publication number 290, the most recent revision, was promulgated in 1974, apd will
be the edition used throughout this Note. See generally Jhirad. Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits, 1974 Revision: The Principal Emendations of the
1962 Text, 9 U.C.C. L.J. 109 (1976) (discussing the 1974 revisions): Kozolchyk,
supra note 1, at 12-16 (same).
26. Ala. Code § 7-5-102(4) (1975): Mo. Ann. Stat. § 400.5-102(4) (Vernon Supp.
1982); N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (McKinney 1964). In the absence of direct conflict
with the UCP, the Code, as the codification of case law, continues to govern in New
York. See United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254,
258 & n.2, 360 N.E.2d 943, 947-48 & n.2, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265. 269-70 & n.2 (1976).
New York bankers were vehemently opposed to the adoption of Article 5 of the Code.
It was felt that the UCP was adequate for international transactions and was, thus,
sufficient to regulate domestic letters of credit. See Penney, Netr York Revisits the
Code: Some Variations in the New York Enactment of the UniJorm Commercial
Code, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 992, 1004-07 (1962). The New York Law Revision Com-
mission was of a similar opinion. "The Commission . . .doubts whether any codifi-
cation of the law of documentary letters of credit is needed. The great usefulness of
the letter of credit device stems largely from its flexibility. Most letter of credit
transactions, moreover, take place in international trade. The desirable objective of
uniformity, both nationally and internationally, is now obtained to a high degree by
decisional law and commercial usage. Legislation in such a field even if it purports to
be declaratory of existing law, should not be adopted unilaterally by American
jurisdictions .... " State of N.Y. Lawv Revision Comm'n, Report of the Lasw Revision
Commission to the Legislature Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code, Legisla-
tive Doc. No. 65(A), at 5, 36 (1956), reprinted in State of N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n, Report and Appendices Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code, at 15,
46 (1956). See generally, I A. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, § 5.72, at 113-14 (discussing
areas of divergence between the Code and the UCP).
27. H. Harfield I, supra note 1, at 225-27: H. Harfield II, supra note 1, at 3;
Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 14 & n.54.
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ever, generally outline the liabilities and responsibilities of all partici-
pants to a letter of credit agreement. 28
The Code treatment of letters of credit is essentially a codification
of preexisting case law,29 viewed by the drafters as "an independent
theoretical frame for the further development of letters of credit. ""'
Article 5 was not intended to be an all-inclusive codification of the
law of letters of credit; 3' it "deals with some but not all of the rules
and concepts of letters of credit as such rules or concepts have devel-
oped prior to this act or may hereafter develop." 32 Thus, as stated by
one commentator, Article 5 is merely "a skeletal structure on or
around which letters of credit may develop."' 33 Letter of credit law
has, consequently, been left to the vagaries of the common law.
Under traditional letter of credit law, the letter is viewed as merely
a conduit for payment. 34 Recently, however, courts have embraced a
contractual characterization of the letter of credit. 35 By construing a
letter in this manner, courts have frequently lost sight of the original
financing purpose and function of the letter mechanism.3 0  It is the
contention of this Note that a letter of credit is not a contract. Al-
though some contract principles applicable to any bilateral obligation
properly apply to letters of credit, others dilute the certainty essential
to a purely paper transaction. Thus, application of contract principles
28. See U.C.P. arts. 7-13 (1974). It should be noted that the majority of these
articles are merely exculpatory provisions for the issuer. See id.
29. United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 258
n.2, 360 N.E.2d 943, 947-48 n.2, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269-70 n.2 (1976); U.C.C. § 5-
101 official comment 1 (1977); see H. Harfield II, supra note 1, at 4.
30. U.C.C. § 5-101 official comment (1977); see Letters oJ Credit, supra note 6,
at 161.
31. See Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1230-32
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 783 (D. Conn. 1980); New Jersey Bank v. Palladino,
77 N.J. 33, 40-41, 389 A.2d 454, 458 (1978); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 Conn. 492, 497-98, 378 A.2d 562, 566 (1977); cf.
U.C.C. § 5-102 official comment 2 (1977) (it would be unwise to codify all the
possible law of letters of credit).
32. U.C.C. § 5-102(3) (1977).
33. H. Harfield II, supra note 1, at 4.
34. See H. Harfield I, supra note 1, at 16; 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, § 5-1:
H. Harfield II, supra note 1, at 1.
35. E.g., Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F.2d 202, 207 (7th Cir.
1978); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465-66 (2d Cir.
1970); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 784 (D. Conn.
1980); West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (W.D. Pa.
1976); Harvey Estes Constr. Co. v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 381 F. Supp. 271, 274
(W.D. Okla. 1974); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32,
36-37 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
36. See Harfield, Code, Customs and Conscience in Letter-of-Credit Law, 4
U.C.C. L.J. 7, 9-11 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Harfield IV]; Judicial Development,
supra note 14, at 145.
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must be selective and gauged entirely upon the effect such application
will have on the letter transaction.
The modern contractual approach in letter of credit law has aban-
doned the requirement of strict compliance 37 with the terms of the
letter in favor of a standard of substanial performance. 38 Under the
theory of substantial performance, 39 courts are requiring banks to
make discretionary determinations concerning a beneficiary's docu-
mentary compliance with the terms of the letter. 40  In attempting to
do equity for the beneficiary, 4' courts have undermined the certainty
so central to the letter of credit. 42
37. Traditional letter of credit law requires a beneficiary to strictly comply with
the terms and conditions of the letter. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage
Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam): Courtaulds N.Am., Inc.
v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 805-06 (4th Cir. 1975); Far E. Textile,
Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 196-97 (S.D. Ohio 1977); H.
Harfield I, supra note 1, at 56-57. A substantial number of courts have held that any
discrepancy in a draft, no matter how trivial, is less than strict compliance and
therefore will allow the issuer to dishonor the beneficiarv's draft. E.g., Bank of Italy
v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 236 N.Y. 106, 108-09, 140 N.E. 211, 213 (1923) (raisins
versus dried grapes); Oriental Pac. (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 78
Misc. 2d 819, 820, 357 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958-59 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (woolen knitwears
versus ladies sweaters, dresses, pants and skirts); Bank Melli & Iran v. Barclays Bank,
[1951] 2 T.L.R. 1057 (K.B.) (goods new versus 100 new goods): J.H. Rayner& Co. v.
Hambro's Bank, Ltd., [1943] 1 K.B. 37, 40 (C.A.) (machine-shelled groundnut
kernels versus Coromandel groundnuts).
38. See, e.g., Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569
F.2d 699, 703 (1st Cir. 1978); Crocker Comm'l Servs., Inc. v. Countryside Bank, No.
81 C 1257 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. Ct.
file); U.S. Indus. v. Second New Haven Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 665 (D. Conn.
1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Wynne, 149 Ga. App. 811, 815-16, 256 S.E.2d 383, 386
(1979); First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90 111. App. 3d 802, 814-15, 413 N.E.2d
1288, 1298 (1980).
39. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 11-22, at 410-12 (2d ed.
1977); L. Simpson, Handbook on the Law of Contracts § 156, at 323-15 (2d ed.
1965); see Backus & Harfield, Custom and Letters of Credit: The Dixon, Irmaos
Case, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 589, 589 (1952). For a discussion of the doctrine of
substantial performance, see infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569
F.2d 699, 703 (1st Cir. 1978); Crocker Comm'l Servs., Inc. v. Countryside Bank, No.
81 C 1257 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. Ct.
file); U.S. Indus. v. Second New Haven Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 665 (D. Conn.
1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Wynne, 149 Ga. App. 811, 815-16, 256 S.E.2d 383, 386
(1979); First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90 Ill. App. 3d 802, 814-15, 413 N.E.2d
1288, 1298 (1980).
41. See Harfield IV, supra note 36, at 9-10: Judicial Development, supra note 14,
at 145; cf. Crocker Comm'l. Servs., Inc. v. Countryside Bank, No. 81 C 1257 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 30, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. Ct. file) (equating the
bank's "hypertechnical" strict compliance defense with tie unregenerate banker in
Frank Capra's film, It's A Wonderful Life).
42. See AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club,
Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 225 (D. Ariz. 1978); Judicial Development, supra note 14, at
166.
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If the letter of credit is to retain its utility as a financing device, the
standard of strict compliance must be revitalized and consistently
applied. Such a standard ensures that prior to honor, the beneficiary
has performed the protective conditions prescribed by the customer,43
while insulating the issuer from disputes unrelated to its ministerial
function. 44 This Note proposes that the flexibility which recommends
a substantial performance standard can be achieved instead by impos-
ing affirmative obligations on the customer and the issuer to facilitate
the beneficiary's literal compliance with the letter's terms.
1. LEGAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE LErTER OF CREDIT
Legal characterization of the letter of credit transaction is not a
mere sophistic exercise. The rights and obligations of the parties to a
letter of credit are to a large extent determined by the legal approach
a court adopts. 45 If the letter is viewed as a contract, the issuer is
vested with discretionary powers that will affect every facet of the
transaction. The terms of the letter become the issuer's terms, 40 and
performance is governed by both contract law and relevant equitable
considerations. 47 A traditional mercantile characterization of the let-
ter of credit, on the other hand, provides solely for an issuer payment
43. International Leather Distribs. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 464 F. Supp.
1197, 1201 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979); North Am, Foreign
Trading Corp. v. General Elecs., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d 890, 891, 413 N.Y.S.2d 700, 702
(1979); J.H. Rayner & Co. v. Hambro's Bank, Ltd., [1943] 1 K.B. 37, 40 (C.A.). see
Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 806 (4th Cir.
1975); Key Appliance, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 37 N.Y.2d 826, 827.28, 339
N.E.2d 888, 888-89, 377 N.Y.S.2d 482, 483 (1975).
44. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir.
1979); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 1977):
Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1962):
Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 781 (D. Conn. 1980): Far
E. Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 196 (S.D. Ohio
1977); Backus & Harfield, supra note 39, at 590; see Joseph, supra note 19, at 850-51.
45. See Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 135. Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Wynne,
149 Ga. App. 811, 816-17, 256 S.E.2d 383, 386-87 (1979) (letters of credit are
contracts and, therefore, substantial performance is the applicable standard of docu-
mentary compliance), with Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l,
608 F.2d 43, 47 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1979) (issuer is only allowed to pay if the documents
submitted strictly comply because the bank's obligation is defined and controlled by
the issuer-customer contract).
46. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d Cir.
1977).
47. See U.S. Indus. v. Second New Haven Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 666 (D.
Conn. 1978); Titanium Metals Corp. v. Space Metals, Inc., 529 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah
1974); First Nat'l Bank v. Wynne, 149 Ga. App. 811, 816, 256 S.E.2d 383, 386
(1979); Schweibish v. Pontchartrain State Bank, 389 So. 2d 731, 737 (La. Ct. App.
1980).
[Vol. 50
LETTERS OF CREDIT
obligation absent any vestige of contractual discretion; 48 the issuer is
empowered only to execute the customer's terms in a literal fashion.4 9
Neither the Code nor the UCP clearly characterize the legal nature
of the letter of credit. The UCP, as merely a codification of banking
practices,50 does not attempt to define the legal derivation of the
letter.5' In the Code, an internal inconsistency or lack of consensus as
to the actual legal nature of a letter of credit is apparent. Section 5-
103, the definitional section, avoids a contractual description by refer-
ring to the letter as "an engagement" between the issuer and the
beneficiary.52  Moreover, the Code provides that there need not be
consideration to create a valid and binding agreement between the
issuer and the beneficiary.53 Yet, in the majority of instances, the
comments refer to the letter of credit as a contract.5 In addition,
Article 5 expressly refers to the Article 2 breach of contract provisions
for guidance in cases of wrongful dishonor.55
Without clear guidance on the appropriate characterization of the
letter of credit, courts and commentators have reached divergent
48. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836, 840-41 (2d Cir.
1962); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776. 781 (D. Conn.
1980); see Laudisi v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 239 N.Y. 234. 239, 146 N.E. 347,
348 (1924); 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, § 5.92. at 12.5-26 (quoting Judgment of
Feb. 6, 1950, Tribunal de Commerce, Seine, 1950 Dalloz Jurisprudence [D. Jur.]
323, 324).
49. Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank, Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 47-48
& n.1 (2d Cir. 1979); Sisalcords do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasileira De Sisal, S.A.,
450 F.2d 419, app. at 422 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (affirming and reprinting
unpublished lower court opinion), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972): see J.H. Rayner
& Co. v. Hambro's Bank, Ltd., [1943] 1 K.B. 37, 42 (C.A.) (Goddard, L.J.,
concurring) ("If the bank accepts the mandate which its customer gives it, it must do
so on the terms which he imposes.").
50. See H. Harfield II, supra note 1, at 3-4: Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 12: J.
White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-3, at 717.
51. See U.C.P. art. 3(a) (1974) (vaguely defining a letter of credit as a "definite
undertaking").
52. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a) (1977). The engagement "may be by way of agreement,
that is, a promise to honor, or by vay of an authority to honor, thus including within
the definition of letter of credit, papers called 'authorities to purchase or pay.' " Id.
official comment 1.
53. U.C.C. § 5-105 (1977) ("No consideration is necessary to establish a credit or
to enlarge or otherwise modify its terms."): see Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock Island
Bank, 570 F.2d 202, 207 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing similar Illinois rule).
54. E.g., U.C.C. § 5-106 official comment 2 (1977) ("so far as the customer or
beneficiary are concerned establishment of [a revocable] credit has no legal signifi-
cance unless the parties provide otherwise in their contracts with the issuer"); id. § 5-
114 official comment 1 ("the letter of credit is essentially a contract between the
issuer and the beneficiary"); id. § 5-116 official comment 3 (the letter of credit should
be "treated like any other contract"). But see id. § 5-103 official comment 1 (letter of
credit is an "engagement").
55. U.C.C. § 5-115(1) (1977) (citing §§ 2-707 to -710).
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conclusions. Numerous courts and scholars have sought to categorize
the letter of credit as a contract, 56 however, no valid formulation has
been offered. The issuer's promise under an irrevocable letter of credit
has been regarded as an offer to the beneficiary to be accepted by his
tender of the required documents 57 - in essence, a unilateral contract
where performance, rather than a return promise, operates as accept-
ance. 58  Many other commentators view this proposition as unsatis-
factory because it fails to explain how, "in the absence of consider-
ation flowing from the [beneficiary] to the [issuer], the latter is bound
from the moment the former has received the [letter]." 5 Moreover,
the required contractual element of mutual assent is lacking in a letter
of credit transaction.60
Another attempt to characterize the letter of credit as a contract
analogizes it to a third-party creditor beneficiary contract;0' such a
characterization, however, conflicts with certain basic principles of
56. Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F.2d 202, 207 (7th Cir. 1978):
Savarin Corp. v. National Bank of Pakistan, 447 F.2d 727, 731 (2d Cir. 1971): Data
Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 784 (D. Conn. 1980); Decor by
Nikkei Int'l v. Federal Rep. of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1980): Far
E. Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 195 (S.D. Ohio
1977); West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (W.D. Pa.
1976); Harvey Estes Constr. Co. v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 381 F. Supp. 271, 274
(W.D. Okla. 1974); see G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 3-23, at 120
(1957); H. Harfield I, supra note 1, at 52-53. For a compilation of older treatises and
articles on the legal nature of letters of credit, see id. at 52 n.6.
57. See Asociacion de Azucareros de Guatemala v. United States Nat'l Bank, 423
F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1970); Baker v. National Boulevard Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021,
1024 (N.D. I1l. 1975); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 36-37
(Colo. 1981) (en banc); First Nat'l Bank v. Wynne, 149 Ga. App. 811, 814, 256
S.E.2d 383, 385 (1979).
58. Under the classic view of a unilateral contract, the promise is revocable until
the act constituting performance is completed. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note
39, § 2-24, at 82; L. Simpson, supra note 39, § 6, at 5-6. Under the modern view,
once the offeree begins to perform, the offeror's promise becomes irrevocable. Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts § 45 (1981). Nevertheless, under either view, some
affirmative act by the promisee is required to bind the promisor. See J. Calamari & J.
Perillo, supra note 39, § 2-24, at 82-83.
59. Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 135-36; see J. White & R. Summers, supra note
6, § 18-2, at 711; Joseph, supra note 19, at 850-51; Comment, Letter of Credit:
Current Theories and Usages, 39 La. L. Rev. 581, 588-90 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Current Theories].
60. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-2, at 711; Kozolchyk, supra note
1, at 135-36; Joseph, supra note 19, at 850-51; Current Theories, supra note 59, at
588-90. The Code demands that the issuer "must honor a draft or demand for
payment which complies with the ...credit"; the beneficiary's state of mind is,
therefore, meaningless. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977).
61. West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1109-10 (W.D.
Pa. 1976); Savage v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 413 F. Supp. 447, 451 (N.D.
Okla. 1976); Harvey Estes Constr. Co. v. Dry Dock Sav. Bank, 381 F. Supp. 271,
274 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
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the letter of credit relationship. 62  In a third-party beneficiary con-
tract, the rights and obligations of the third party depend upon the
validity of the contract between the promisee and the promisor. 3
The promisor can assert any defense against the third-part), benefi-
ciary that he could assert against the promisee.14  In a letter of credit
transaction, however, the issuer-promisor has no such right. Rather it
must honor demands for payment that comply with the letter regard-
less of the validity of the customer-issuer contract.6 5 The letter of
credit is an obligation totally independent of the underlying contracts
that it facilitates,6 6 while a third-party beneficiary contract is a tripar-
tite arrangement with interrelated obligations and liabilities.67
Most commentators have been sensitive to the inherent contradic-
tions in analogizing the letter of credit to a contract. To many
scholars, a letter of credit is definitely not a contract, but rather an
"engagement" 68 or "undertaking,"'69 and consequently, "nothing more
than a written promise by a bank."-70 This contention, though prem-
ised upon the technical deficiencies of characterizing the letter of
credit as a contract, is much influenced by the uncertainty that results
from a contractual approach to letter transactions.' Many courts
and commentators, therefore, maintain that letters of credit serve
only a ministerial financing function 72 and as such are "largely bot-
tomed upon the legal concept of strict performance."-73
62. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-2. at 714: Joseph, supra note
19, at 850-51; Current Theories, supra note 59, at 590.
63. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 17-9, at 628: G. Crismore,
Principles of the Law' of Contracts § 243, at 397-98 (rev. ed. 1965): L. Simpson,
supra note 39, § 121, at 254-55.
64. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 17-8; see Rotermund v. United
States Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139, 1142 (8th Cir. 1973).
65. East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank. 593 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir.
1979); U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977).
66. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
67. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 17-8 (promisor's defenses), id. §
17-9 (vesting); id. § 17-10 (rights of the beneficiary against the promisee): id. § 17-11
(rights of the promisee against the promisor).
68. Mentschicoff, How to Handle Letters of Credit, 19 Bus. Law. 107, 107-08
(1963).
69. Malcolm, Panel Discussion on the Uniform Commerical Code, Report of the
New York Law Revision Coinmission-Areas of Agreement and Disagreement, 12
Bus. Law. 49, 60-61 (1956).
70. Wiley, How To Use Letters of Credit in Financing the Sale of Goods, 20 Bus.
Law. 495, 496 (1965). In no section of Article 5 is it provided that the beneficiary
must make a promise of any kind in exchange for the issuer's promise to pay. The
beneficiary need only present conforming documents to obtain payment. U.C.C. § 5-
114(1) (1977).
71. See Backus & Harfield, supra note 39, at 589-91.
72. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir.
1979); Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir.
1962); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 781 (D. Conn.
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Though not a contract, a letter of credit can be viewed as a distant
cousin with thoroughly unique legal characteristics:74 "Probably the
best explanation is simply to call a letter of credit a transaction Sti
generis-a relationship with no perfect analogies but nevertheless a
well defined set of rights and obligations. ' 75 One advocate of the &ui
generis concept is Boris Kozolchyk.7 6 Sensitive to both "the socioeco-
nomic forces that prompted its use and to the legal conceptualization
that made it operative, ' 77 he proposes that the letter of credit be
conceptualized as a new type of mercantile currency. 78 Kozolehyk
argues that if viewed as a type of negotiable instrument, the letter
would embody a high degree of certainty and the terms of the credit
would be inviolate. 79  This formulation demands that the letter of
credit be a formal and abstract payment mechanism quite alien to the
malleability of a contractual transaction.A0
Despite the theoretical and practical problems, courts in recent
years have held that a letter is a contract between the issuer and the
beneficiary governed by traditional principles of contract law.8' The
1980); Far E. Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 196
(S.D. Ohio 1977); Backus & Harfield, supra note 39, at 590; see Chase Manhattan
Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 1977); Joseph, supra note 19, at 850-
51.
73. Backus & Harfield, supra note 39, at 590.
74. See Joseph, supra note 19, at 850 ("The letter of credit evolved as a mercan-
tile specialty, and the only way to understand all its facets is to recognize that it is an
entity unto itself.").
75. 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, § 5.53, at 103 (footnote omitted); accord H.
Harfield I, supra note 1, at 53; see Farmers' Nat'l Bank v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 52 F.
191, 194-95 (6th Cir. 1892).
76. Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 137.
77. Id. at 139.
78. Id. at 139-40.
79. Id. at 140. Kozolchyk maintains that the letter of credit can be viewed as a
negotiable instrument because it meets the definition of a negotiable instrument in
Article 3. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b) (1977) (a negotiable instrument must
"contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money")).
Kozolchyk posits that the conditions of a letter of credit are merely formalities
required for payment, apparently equating them to a signature under an ordinary
bank check. See id. Contra Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., 311 Minn. 452,
457-58, 250 N.W.2d 172, 176-77 (1977) ("[T]he existence of conditions precedent to
payment as well as the duty of the issuing bank to reject non-complying documents
take it out of the purview of an unconditional promise to pay.").
80. See Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 140.
81. E.g., Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F.2d 202, 207 (7th Cir.
1978); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465-66 (2d Cir.
1970); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 784 (D. Conn.
1980); West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (W.D. Pa.
1976); Dynamics Corp. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 356 F. Supp. 991,
999 (N.D. Ga. 1973); J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Crindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 37
N.Y.2d 220, 225, 333 N.E.2d 168, 172, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 897, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
866 (1975); Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Space Metals Inc., 529 P.2d 431, 433
(Utah 1974).
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letter of credit has been construed against the drafter " and inter-
preted in a manner that tends to uphold, rather than defeat, the
credit.83 Moreover, the issuer's failure to perform under a letter has
been treated as a contractual repudiation that requires all the ele-
ments of an action for breach of contract.
84
The most problematical area of contract law application, however,
concerns documentary compliance with the letter of credit.
II. DOCUMENTARY COMPLIANCE
A. Waiver of Terms on Presentment:
Returning to Strict Compliance
Article 5 of the Uniform Commerical Code expressly avoids setting
a minimum standard of documentary compliance, leaving adjudica-
tion of the issue to the courts.85  The Code provides only that the
issuer must honor drafts which comply "'on their face" with the terms
of the letter.8 6  The UCP is also quite general in providing for a
standard of documentary compliance. Article 7 requires that docu-
82. E.g., United States '. Sun Bank, 609 F.2d 832, 833 (5th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam); East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598,
602 (5th Cir. 1979), Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock Island Bank. 570 F.2d 202, 207 (7th
Cir. 1978); Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d 1077,
app. A at 1082 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (adopting memorandum decision of
lower court); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 467 (2d Cir.
1970); West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (\.D. Pa.
1976).
83. E.g., Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F.2d 202, 207-08 (7th
Cir. 1978); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir.
1970); West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka. 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (W.D. Pa.
1976).
84. Decor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Rep. of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893, 907
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); see National Bank & Trust Co. v. J.L.M. Int'l, Inc., 421 F. Supp.
1269, 1272-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1976): North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. General
Elecs., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d 890, 891-92, 413 N.Y.S.2d 700, 702 (1979): cf. U.C.C. § 5-
115(2) (1977) (providing Article 2 damage remedies for breach of letter of credit).
85. U.C.C. § 5-102 official comment 2 (1977) ("The more important areas not
covered by this Article revolve around the question of when documents in fact and in
law do or do not comply with the terms of the credit."): see U.S. Indus. v. Second
New Haven Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 664 (D. Conn. 1978). Critics of Article 5
maintain that the Code should have, as a minimum, provided a standard by which
the conformity of documents could be determined. See State of N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n, Study of Uniform Commercial Code: Article 5-Documentary Letters of
Credit, Legislative Doc. No. 65(F), at 66 (1955), reprinted in 3 State of N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1955, at 1569, 1634
[hereinafter cited as 1955 Report]; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-6, at
729; Comment, Letters of Credit Under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code:
An Opportunity Missed, 62 Yale L.J. 227, 248 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Opportu-
nity Missed].
86. U.C.C. § 5-109(2) (1977), construed in Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank,
550 F.2d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 1977); U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977).
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ments be examined by the issuer "with reasonable care to ascertain
that they appear on their face to be in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the credit. 8 7
In the absence of statutory or codified guidance, the majority of
courts require strict compliance with the terms of a letter of credit. 88
The doctrine of strict compliance demands that issuer verification of
documents upon presentment must be both literal and exacting.89 As
stated by Lord Summer in the prominent English case of Equitable
Trust Co. v. Dawson Partners,90 "[t]here is no room for documents
which are almost the same, or which will do just as well." 9' Follow-
ing the lead of the First Circuit in Banco Espanol de Credito v. State
Street Bank and Trust Co., 92 however, courts have added "leaven [to]
the loaf of strict construction. ' 93 By emphasizing the crucial impor-
tance of flexibility in commercial transactions, 94 courts now attempt
to distinguish between material and immaterial variations from the
terms of the letter. 95 As a result, a draft that reasonably complies
with the letter's terms will be considered in strict compliance absent a
finding that the issuer has been misled to his detriment. 9 For exam-
ple, in U.S. Industries v. Second New Haven Bank,9 7 the District
87. U.C.P. art. 7 (1974).
88. First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90 Ill. App. 3d 802, 814-15, 413 N.E.2d
1288, 1298 (1980); see cases cited supra note 37.
89. Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 805-06
(4th Cir. 1975) ("as the predominant authorities unequivocally declare, the benefi-
ciary must meet the terms of the credit-and precisely-if it is to exact performance
of the issuer"); see H. Harfield I, supra note 1, at 73.
90. [1927] 27 Lloyd's List L.R. 49.
91. Id. at 52.
92. 385 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968).
93. Id. at 234; see, e.g., Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l
Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 704 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1978); U.S. Indus. v. Second New Haven
Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 664-65 (D. Conn. 1978); First Arlington Nat'l Bank v.
Stathis, 90 Ill. App. 3d 802, 814-15, 413 N.E.2d 1288, 1298 (1980).
94. H. Harfield II, supra note 1, at 50-51.
95. See Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 47
n.1 (2d Cir. 1979) (documents must "strictly comply with the essential requirements
of the letter of credit" (emphasis added)); Banco Espanol de Credito v. State Street
Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230, 237 (1st Cir. 1967) (enforceable compliance when
the documentary draft "conformed in all significant respects"), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1013 (1968); U.S. Indus. v. Second New Haven Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 664 (D.
Conn. 1978) (although the submitted documents did not strictly comply, they put the
issuer "on notice" and were therefore sufficient); First Arlington Nat'l Bank v.
Stathis, 90 Ill. App. 3d 802, 816, 413 N.E.2d 1288, 1299 (1980) (compliance is
sufficient where the documentary draft did not "deviate significantly" from tile
letter's requirements).
96. Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699,
705 (1st Cir. 1978); U.S. Indus. v. Second New Haven Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 665
(D. Conn. 1978).
97. 462 F. Supp. 662 (D. Conn. 1978).
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Court of Connecticut held that the documents tendered by the benefi-
ciary strictly complied98 even though the draft omitted ihe required
certification evidencing that payment had been demanded of the
issuer's customer. 9 The court held that the rule of strict compliance,
when viewed in terms of letter of credit policy, must only control
where there is a "fatal" variance in the documents. 00 It seems that
"almost the same or . . .just as well"' 0' is now good enough.102
Courts, by viewing a letter of credit as a contract, have made the
error of equating substantial performance of a contract with substan-
tial compliance under a letter of credit. 0 3 Not one of the underlying
principles and traditional justifications that recommend the contrac-
tual doctrine of substantial performance exists in the letter of credit
situation. The doctrine is designed to prevent forfeiture by a promisee
when a promisor has received substantially all the performance for
which he bargained. 10 4 In such cases, courts wvill enforce the contract
so as to fulfill the justifiable expectations of the parties. 0 5 Yet, in a
letter of credit transaction, when a draft is rightfully dishonored due
to less than strict compliance, the issuer is not unjustly enriched. As a
payment intermediary, the issuer provides the service for a small fee10c
and has little to gain in the case of either honor or dishonor.17  The
beneficiary suffers no true forfeiture for he either retains ownership of
the goods or the customer waives the non-compliance and accepts
delivery.10 8
98. Id. at 665.
99. Id. at 664.
100. Id. at 665 (quoting Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l
Bank, 569 F.2d 699, 705 (1st Cir. 1978)).
101. Equitable Trust Co. v. Dawson Partners, 11927] 27 Lloyd's List L.R. 49, 52.
102. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
103. See cases cited supra note 38.
104. Hadden v. Consolidated Edison Co., 34 N.Y.2d 88, 97, 312 N.E.2d 445, 449-
50, 356 N.Y.S.2d 249, 255 (1974): see 3A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §§ 704-
707; L. Simpson, supra note 39, § 156, at 325-26: 6 S. Williston, A Treatise on the
Law of Contracts § 843 (3d ed. 1961).
105. G. Grismore, supra note 63, § 144 at 203: see Ballou v. Basic Constr. Co.,
407 F.2d 1137, 1140 (4th Cir. 1969), In re Kinney Aluminum Co., 78 F. Supp. 565,
567-68 (S.D. Cal. 1948); Hadden v. Consolidated Edison Co., 34 N.Y.2d 88, 98-99,
312 N.E.2d 445, 450-51, 356 N.Y.S.2d 249, 256-57 (1974).
106. H. Harfield I, supra note 1, at 58.
107. Cf. U.C.C. § 5-109 official comment 1 (1977) ("the issuer receives compensa-
tion for a payment service rather than for a guaranty of performance").
108. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-6, at 728: see H. Harfield I, supra
note 1, at 72-73; supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. A far greater risk of
forfeiture exists, however, in a standby letter of credit situation. See supra note 6
(discussing standby letters). Should the beneficiary's draft be dishonored due to less
than strict compliance, there would be no goods to retain or attach. Yet, as in any
other letter of credit transaction, the customer's default is still actionable by way of
the underlying contract. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-6, at 728 ("the
beneficiary may still recover from the customer in an action on the underlying
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Moreover, the doctrine of substantial performance was designed
only to excuse the performance of constructive conditions. 00 Such
conditions are not the expressed intentions of the parties, but are
imposed by law to do justice." 0 Thus, "no difficulty is encountered
in an objection that the doctrine of substantial performance in permit-
ting a recovery is a departure from the terms of the contract."" A
letter of credit, however, embodies express terms and conditions de-
signed to ensure the adequacy of the beneficiary's return perform-
ance." 2 Because the doctrine of substantial performance is not appli-
cable to express conditions of contractual obligations,'" it is an
inappropriate standard for performance under a letter of credit.
By requiring the issuer to accept even minor defects in the benefi-
ciary's draft, courts are implicitly granting the issuer the discretion to
waive those terms of the letter that it believes are unimportant." 4 In
fact, in the opinion of one code commentator, issuer waiver is autho-
rized as an implied term of the customer-issuer contract." 5 Under
this rationale, the waiver of documentary noncompliance is accept-
able as long as the issuer exercised good faith." 0 This approach
contract"); see H. Harfield I, supra note 1, at 72-73: cf. KMW Int'l v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1979) (preliminary injunction vacated
because action on the underlying contract negates possibility of irreparable harm
where fraudulent letter of credit is honored): U.C.C. § 5-109 official comment 1
(1977) ("[t]he customer will normally have direct recourse against the beneficiary If
performance fails").
109. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 11-22, at 410; L. Simpson, supra
note 39, § 156; see Pasquel v. Owen, 186 F.2d 263, 270 (8th Cir. 1950).
110. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 11-11, at 395: G. Grismore, supra
note 63, § 132, at 184-85; L. Simpson, supra note 39, § 152, at 318.
111. L. Simpson, supra note 39, § 156, at 324.
112. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
113. SeeJ. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 11-7, at 389; L. Simpson, supra
note 39, § 151, at 313; 5 S. Williston, supra note 104, § 675. In cases of extreme
forfeiture, the doctrine of substantial performance has been applied to express condi-
tions. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 243-44, 129 N.E. 889, 891
(1921). The primary application of this exception is in the area of construction
contracts where the substantially completed structure cannot be returned to the
contractor. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 11-22, at 411. In a sales
contract, however, the goods can, if defective, be returned or refused. See U.C.C. §
2-601 (1977). Moreover. an action on the underlying contract can always be main-
tained. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Thus, no true forfeiture exists in a
letter transaction, and this exception is not applicable.
114. See Judicial Development, supra note 14, at 152-53. Waiver after defective
performance is the election by the promisor to continue his performance after a
failure of an express condition or material failure of a constructive condition. See J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 11-37, at 449, Waiver is discretionary by
definition because "the promisor has a choice between alternative courses of con-
duct." L. Simpson, supra note 39, § 171, at 352 (footnote omitted).
115. See 3 R. Anderson, supra note 8, § 5-109:8, at 394.
116. Id.; see U.C.C. § 5-109 official comment 1 (1977) (issuer-customer contract
"includes the obligation of good faith imposed by Section 1-203").
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contradicts the custom and usage of trade in the banking industry,
which observes the strict compliance standard"-- and is an implied
term of the customer-issuer contract."'8
Moreover, the contractual principles of waiver belie its applicabil-
ity to a letter of credit transaction. An effective waiver must arise
from the conduct of a party "for whose benefit the condition ex-
ists."119 Under a letter of credit, however, the terms and conditions
are selected by, and are for the benefit of, the customer. 120 When the
issuer honors a draft that less than strictly complies, it is waiving terms
.or conditions that exist for the customer's benefit: clearly a case of
improper party waiver.' 2' In addition, the issuer is not a party to a
contract with the beneficiary' 2 2 and thus can possess no discretionary
powers to waive the terms of the letter.123
Allowing the issuer to waive terms or conditions that exist for the
benefit of the customer would frustrate the purpose of the letter
transaction by diminishing the customer's chances of receiving satis-
factory performance of the underlying transaction.2 4 The rationale
behind requiring strict compliance with the terms of the letter of
credit is assurance-assurance of payment for the beneficiary'2 and
117. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
118. U.C.C. § 5-109 official comment 1 (1977) (the issuer-customer contract
includes "the observance of any course of dealing or usage of trade made applicable
by Section 1-205"').
119. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 39, § 11-37. at 449: accord 3A A. Corbin,
supra note 104, § 752, at 532 (Supp. 1980): G. Grismore, supra note 63, § 169. at
249.
120. Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 60S F.2d 43, 47-48
& n.1 (2d Cir. 1979); see Anglo-South Am. Trust Co. v. Uhe, 261 N.Y. 150, 156-57,
184 N.E. 741, 743 (1933). "It is essential for the protection of the interests of the
[customer] that the issuer of the credit not interpret its instructions, but execute them
literally .... "Judgment of Feb. 6, 1950, Tribunal de Commerce, Seine. 1950 D.
Jur. 323, 324, translated in I A. Lowenfeld, supra note I, § 5.92, at 125-26.
121. Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 807
(4th Cir. 1975); International Leather Distribs. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 464 F.
Supp. 1197, 1201-03 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mnen., 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979): see North
Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. General Elecs., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d 890, 892, 413
N.Y.S.2d 700, 702-03 (1979).
122. See Baker v. National Boulevard Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 & n.3 (N.D.
Il. 1975); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-2, at 711: supra notes 68-75
and accompanying text.
123. Corporacion de Mereadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 47-48
& n.1 (2d Cir. 1979); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d
171, 176 (3d Cir. 1979); Interco, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 560 F.2d 480, 483 (1st Cir.
1977); Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir.
1962); Anglo-South Am. Trust Co. v. Uhe, 261 N.Y. 150, 156-57, 184 N.E. 741, 743
(1933).
124. See North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. General Elecs., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d
890, 892, 413 N.Y.S.2d 700, 703 (1979).
125. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d
Cir. 1979); Pringle-Associated Mtge. Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871,
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assurance of performance for the customer. 2 6  A number of courts
have begun to acknowledge the improper party waiver implicit in the
application of the substantial compliance standard. 2 7 For example,
in a recent New York decision, 2 the court held that "common sense"
demanded that the terms of a letter of credit be considered as an
essential protective device for the customer and as such should be
strictly complied with absent customer waiver. 2
No better evidence exists for the proposition that the doctrine of
substantial performance erodes the certainty of the letter of credit
transaction than the frequency of litigation in the area of documen-
tary compliance. 30 In the letter of credit field, "whatever litigation
there is, usually is caused by some actual or alleged variance between
the documents specified in the credit and the documents actually
presented, rather than by doubts concerning the applicable legal prin-
ciples." 13' Strict compliance invites certainty by setting a standard by
which all parties to the transaction can gauge conforming perform-
874 (5th Cir. 1978); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464
(2d Cir. 1970); West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1109-10
(W.D. Pa. 1976); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp.
991, 995 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
126. H. Harfield I, supra note 1, at 57; see North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v.
General Elecs., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d 890, 891, 413 N.Y.S.2d 700, 703 (1979): J.H,
Rayner & Co. v. Hambro's Bank, Ltd., [1942] 1 K.B. 37 (C.A.).
127. International Leather Distribs. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 464 F. Supp.
1197, 1201-02 (S.D.N.Y.), a]f'd mem., 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979); North Am.
Foreign Trading Corp. v. General Elecs., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d 890, 891, 413 N.Y.S.2d
700, 702-03 (1979); Key Appliance, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 46 A.D.2d 622,
622, 359 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887 (1974) (per curiam), aff'd mere., 37 N.Y.2d 826, 339
N.E.2d 888, 377 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1975).
128. North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. General Elecs., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d 890,
413 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1979).
129. Id. at 891-92; 413 N.Y.S.2d at 702-03; see Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 1975).
130. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 85, at 64, reprinted in 1955
Report, supra note 85, at 1632; see J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-6, at
729; Current Theories, supra note 59, at 597-98; Opportunity Missed, supra note 85,
at 247; see, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171 (3d
Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l
Bank, 569 F.2d 699 (1st Cir. 1978); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l
Bank, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425
F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1970); Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co.,
385 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968); Crocker Comm'l
Servs. Inc. v. Countryside Bank, No. 81 C 1257 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1981) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. Ct. file); Far E. Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. Ohio 1977); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 Conn. 492, 378 A.2d 562 (1977); First Arlington Nat'l
Bank v. Stathis, 90 Ill. App. 3d 802, 413 N.E.2d 1288 (1980).
131. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 85, at 64, reprinted in 1955
Report, supra note 85, at 1632 n.167.
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ance.' 32 Substantial compliance, on the other hand, invites discretion
by the issuer, who must determine whether compliance under the
vague standard of "almost as good" is good enough. '3 By diluting the
traditional literal standard of compliance, courts have forced issuers
to assume the role of judges of first impression w%'ho must calculate, in
a short period of time,' 34 whether the beneficiary would have an
action for wrongful dishonor 35 or, conversely, whether honor would
be a bar to reimbursement. 36 Such uncertainty guarantees lawsuits,
not payment, and therefore, frustrates the basic purpose of the letter
of credit.13
1
In addition to engendering uncertainty, the doctrine of substantial
compliance directly conflicts with Article 5 of the Code. Although
Article 5 avoids setting a standard of documentary compliance,' 38 it
132. See Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 77: Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile
Nat'1 Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1239 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismzissed. 414 U.S. 1139
(1974).
133. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 175-76 (3d
Cir. 1979). "[T]he bank assumes a primary obligation in part because its commit-
ment is clearly defined within the four corners of the letter. If courts deviate from the
rule of strict compliance and insist in certain undefined situations that banks make
payments [although] the beneficiary failed to comply with the terms stipulated in the
letter of credit, the certainty that makes this device so attractive and useful may well
be undermined, with the result that banks may become reluctant to assume the
additional risks of litigation." Id. at 176.
134. Banco Espanol de Credito v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 266 F. Supp. 106,
109 (D. Mass.), rev'd on other grounds, 385 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied.
390 U.S. 1013 (1968). The Code provides that the issuer must determine compliance
by "the close of the third banking day following receipt of the documents." U.C.C. §
5-112(1)(a) (1977). UCP article 8(d), however, requires that "the issuing bank shall
have a reasonable time to examine the documents." U.C.P. art. 8(d) (1974). Henry
Harfield finds the reasonable time standard to be more in line with the "expectations
of businessmen." H. Harfield II, supra note 1, at 67.
135. See U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977). Wrongful dishonor occurs when "a draft or
demand for payment which complies with the terms of the relevant credit" is not
honored by the issuer. Id. Beneficiary remedies are explicitly provided for in id. § 5-
115. See generally J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-6 (analysis of types of
wrongful dishonor and the remedies that are available to the beneficiary): H. Har-
field I, supra note 1, at 109-10 (same).
136. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank. 550 F.2d 882 , 886 (3d Cir. 1977).
The remedies available to a customer claiming wrongful honor by the issuer are not
specified in the Code. To many commentators, this statutory void is well explained
by the fact that "lawyers for issuers greatly influenced the drafting of Article Five .-
J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-7, at 741 (footnote omitted): accord State
of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 85, at 62, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra
note 85, at 1630; Judicial Development, supra note 14, at 160-62.
137. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 176 (3d Cir.
1979) (per curiam); see J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-6, at 728.
138. U.C.C. § 5-102 official comment 2 (1977) ("The more important areas not
covered by this Article revolve around the question of when documents in fact and in
law do or do not comply with the terms of the credit.").
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does govern both the issuer's obligations under the issuer-customer
contract 139 and the issuer's right to amend the letter of credit. 40
Comment 1 to section 5-109 states that "[t]he extent of the issuer's
obligation to its customer is based upon the agreement between the
two.' 141 Because the letter of credit is issued specifically on the basis
of the terms of the customer-issuer contract, 142 the Code demands that
honor of the beneficiary's draft also be conditioned on these terms. 143
By honoring a defective draft, the issuer has not fulfilled its contrac-
tual obligations to the customer. 144 Moreover, the comments to sec-
tion 5-114 expressly limit the issuer's duties to the customer to the
examination of documents. 45  The issuer is not the agent of the
customer; 46 no discretionary power to vary the letter is expressed or
implied. 147 Thus court enforcement of issuer waiver of letter terms
upon presentment is per se the enforcement, if not the creation, of a
breach of the issuer-customer contract.
The Article 5 requirements for valid amendments to the letter of
credit are also violated by the doctrine of substantial compliance. On
the most basic level, issuer waiver of terms on presentment constitutes
a unilateral modification in direct conflict with the requirements of
Code section 5-10614 and, in light of court interpretation, UCP ar-
ticle 3(c). 149 According to section 5-106 of the Code, the significance
139. Id. § 5-109.
140. Id. § 5-106(2), (3).
141. Id. § 5-109 official comment 1.
142. Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 47-48
& n.1 (2d Cir. 1979); Anglo-South Am. Trust Co. v. Uhe, 261 N.Y. 150, 156-57, 184
N.E. 741, 743 (1933): see U.C.P. general provision and definition (b) (1974).
143. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977); see id. § 5-109(2).
144. See Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 47-
48 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1979); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 881, 886 (3d
Cir. 1977); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802,
805-06 (4th Cir. 1975); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465
(2d Cir. 1970).
145. U.C.C. § 5-114 official comment 2 (1977).
146. H. Harfield I, supra note 1, at 103-05. Unlike an agent, the issuer of a letter
of credit is directly and primarily liable to the beneficiary. Id. at 104. Moreover,
agents owe their principals a fiduciary duty while an issuer must split his loyalty
between customer and beneficiary. Id.
147. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir.
1962). "The duties of a bank under a letter of credit are created by the document
itself, the bank being deprived of any discretion not granted therein." Id., accord
Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 47-48 & n. I
(2d Cir. 1979); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 176
(3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Laudisi v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 239 N.Y. 234,
239, 146 N.E. 347, 348 (1924); CNA Mtge. Invs., Ltd. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 540
S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).
148. U.C.C. § 5-106(2) (1977); see National Bank & Trust Co. v. J.L.M. Int'l,
Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
149. U.C.P. art. 3(c) (1974); see KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606
F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The issuing bank's obligation under an international
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of acquiring a letter of credit is that, once established, no modification
of the terms of the letter is binding absent consent.'5 At the point of
establishment, "the issuer is no longer free to take unilateral action
with respect to the cancellation of the credit or the modification of its
terms."1,5 Under the UCP, irrevocable letters of credit can be modi-
fied or cancelled only with the consent of "all parties thereto." 15- A
majority of courts view a unilateral modification of an irrevocable
letter of credit as legally unacceptable. 5 3 If allowed, the distinction
between revocable and irrevocable letters of credit would be rendered
meaningless. 154 Under an irrevocable credit, the issuer makes a bind-
ing promise to the customer to enforce the terms provided in the
issuer-customer contract 55 and a binding promise of payment to the
irrevocable letter of credit may not be modified without the consent of both the
customer and the beneficiary."); AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-
American Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 224 (D. Ariz. 1978) ("The UCP
plainly requires the consent of all, not just two parties to the letter of credit.").
150. The Code specifies that "'a [letter of] credit is established (a) as regards the
customer as soon as a letter of credit is sent to him or the letter of credit or an
authorized written advice of its issuance is sent to the beneficiary-, and (b) as regards
the beneficiary when he receives a letter of credit or an authorized written advice of
its issuance." U.C.C. § 5-106(1) (1977); see Goodwin Bros. Leasing v. Citizens Bank,
587 F.2d 730, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1979) (once the letter of credit left the issuer's control
it was established as regarded the customer, and the bank "'as thereafter powerless to
modify or cancel it even though the beneficiary had yet to receive the letter). But see
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1977) (bank
empowered to modify terms of letter).
151. U.C.C. § 5-106 official comment 1 (1977).
152. U.C.P. art. 3(c) (1974). It could be argued that the customer is not a part)' to
the letter of credit. The customer is usually not a named party to the credit instru-
ment, nor can he legally force the issuer to honor the draft submitted by the
beneficiary. Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 108. Moreover, the customer is not a
necessary party to an action by the beneficiary for wrongful dishonor. Housing See.,
Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311 (Me. 1978). The Maine Supreme Court has
held that complete relief could be accorded the beneficiary in a case of wrongful
dishonor without making the customer a party to the action. Id. at 316. The basis for
this decision was that "'[t]he issuer's obligation to the beneficiary is completely
independent of both the relationship between the issuer and its customer in regard to
the letter of credit and the relationship between the customer and the beneficiary on
the underlying transaction." Id. Applying this reasoning, a court could obviate the
requirement of customer consent for a valid amendment of the letter. Kozolchyk,
supra note 1, at 108; cf. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886-87
& n.7 (3d Cir. 1977) (allowing issuer-beneficiary modification of a letter of credit
governed by the UCP).
153. E.g., Goodwin Bros. Leasing v. Citizens Bank, 587 F.2d 730, 733-34 (5th
Cir. 1979); Interco, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 560 F.2d 480, 483 (1st Cir. 1977);
National Bank & Trust Co. v. J.L.M. Int'l, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); see Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1238 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
154. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 782 (D.
Conn. 1980); U.C.C. § 5-106(3) (1977).
155. U.C.C. § 5-109(2) & official comment 2 (1977); see Corporacion de Merca-
deo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 47-48 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1979): Interna-
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beneficiary if these terms are met.1 56 To sanction unilateral amend-
ment of the letter of credit would destroy the certainty of payment-
the raison d'&tre of both customer and beneficiary participation in the
letter transaction. 157
Even if the issuer waiver inherent in a substantial compliance
standard is conceptualized as a bilateral modification with the benefi-
ciary, it would be unenforceable against the customer, absent his
consent, under either the UCP or the Code. All courts have inter-
preted the Code 158 and the UCP 159 as requiring the consent of the
customer to effect a modification enforceable against him in an action
for reimbursement by the issuer.
B. Ameliorating Strict Compliance
1. Estoppel: Curing Defective Performance
Before Expiration of the Letter
Application of the strict compliance standard can be quite burden-
some to the beneficiary: 60 Even trivial defects in the documentary
tional Leather Distribs. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 464 F. Supp. 1197, 1201
n.9 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979).
156. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1977); see supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
158. See KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir.
1979); Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1238 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v.
Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 224 (D. Ariz. 1978);
Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 189 F. Supp. 922, 927 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), aff'd, 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1962); City Nat'l Bank v. Westland Towers Apts.,
107 Mich. App. 213, 221, 309 N.W.2d 209, 214 (1981); J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v.
Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 225-26, 333 N.E.2d 168, 172, 371
N.Y.S.2d 892, 897, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); It's Devine Indus. v. Bank
Leumi Trust Co., 22 U.C.C. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 130, 131 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
But cJ. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1977)
(court held that a bilateral modification between the issuer and beneficiary merely
"jeopardizes [the issuer's] right to reimbursement from the customer").
159. E.g., KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir.
1979) ("The issuing bank's obligation under an international irrevocable letter of
credit may not be modified without the consent of both the customer and the
beneficiary."); AMF Head Sports Wear Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-American Sports
Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 224 (D. Ariz. 1978) ("The U.C.P. plainly requires the
consent of all, not just two parties to the letter of credit.").
160. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 175 (3d
Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (court acknowledged that strict compliance can be "harsh"
but posited that the beneficiary "must ... assume responsibility for [any] unfortu-
nate result"); AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club,
Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222, 225 (D. Ariz. 1978) (summary judgment granted in favor of
the bank even though "the conduct of the bank [was] inequitable"). If the beneficiary
finds the customer's terms in a letter of credit too onerous, he may refuse it. Under
the Code, "[f]ailure of the [customer] to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a breach
of the contract for sale." U.C.C. § 2-325(1) (1977). Moreover, the UCP advises
issuing banks to "discourage any attempt by the [customer] . . . to include excessive
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draft will force dishonor.' 6' He must, therefore, diligently monitor
his performance if honor is to be effectuated.6 2 As the part , solely
responsible for determining compliance, the issuer should have a con-
comitant obligation to facilitate the functioning of the exacting stand-
ard advocated by this Note.
In the area of issuer dishonor for documentary deficiency, the
courts have begun to insist that the issuer make full disclosure of all
documentary defects at the time of honor or dishonor or be estopped
from raising them at trial. 63 When the issuer places dishonor on one
ground, all others are waived,164 or when the issuer is silent until the
time of expiration of the credit, no non-conformity may be raised at
trial for wrongful dishonor. 65 This application of equitable waiver
and estoppel is premised on the beneficiary's justifiable reliance upon
issuer representations as the sole indication of documentary compli-
ance. 1
66
Application of estoppel is usually conditioned upon proof that the
beneficiary could have cured the defect, not raised by the issuer,
detail." U.C.P. general provisions and definitions (d) (1974). These provisions should
temper the potential for onerous documentary requirements.
161. See supra notes 37, 89-91 and accompanying text.
162. Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 805-06
(4th Cir. 1975); see supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d
43, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1979); Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d
1224, 1236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Bank of Canton,
Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 509 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 636 F.2d 30
(2d Cir. 1980); Data Gen. Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 776, 785-86
(D. Conn. 1980); U.S. Indus. v. Second New Haven Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 665-66
(D. Conn. 1978); see East Bank v. Dovenmuehle, Inc., 196 Colo. 422, 429, 589 P.2d
1361, 1366 (1978).
164. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 123.6 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. v. Union
Nat'l Bank, 1 F.2d 65, 66 (3d Cir. 1924); Bank of Canton, Ltd. v. Republic Nat'l
Bank, 509 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 636 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980);
Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs., 634 P.2d 32, 41 (Colo. 1981) (en
banc); Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co., 583 S.W.2d 852, 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); see
North Valley Bank v. National Bank, 437 F. Supp. 70, 74 (N.D. Il. 1977).
165. U.S. Indus. v. Second New Haven Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 666 (D. Conn.
1978) ("the defendant is estopped from asserting any defense it may have had
concerning non-conformity of the documentary demand for payment without calling
the discrepancy to the attention of the plaintiff prior to the expiration of the letter of
credit"); Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 387 F. Supp. 92,
105 (M.D.N.C.) ("the issuer cannot be permitted to deal with a beneficiary over an
extended period of time, realizing a potential discrepancy exists and, in effect, lie in
wait to ambush the beneficiary with this dofese if the transaction goes sour"), rev'd
on other grounds, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975).
166. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1236 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); U.S. Indus. v. Second New Haven
Bank, 462 F. Supp. 662, 666 (D. Conn. 1978); East Bank v. Dovenmuehle, Inc., 196
Colo. 422, 429, 589 P.2d 1361, 1366 (1978).
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within the effective period of the letter. 1 7 If cure was not possible,
the reliance was, by definition, not detrimental. 108  This standard
was enunciated in Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile National
Bank,16 in which the Fifth Circuit held that
[the issuer] cannot lull [the customer] into believing that there was
no problem with the documentation when there was still time for
[the customer] to have attempted to cure the technical defect and
then turn around and assert the lack thereof as a defense to the suit
on the draft.170
If courts apply the standard of strict compliance, the beneficiary
should be given every opportunity to meet the letter's requirements.
Under a letter of credit, time is of the essence;17 1 a documentary
demand for payment must occur before the letter of credit expires. 72
167. Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699,
703-04 (1st Cir. 1978). In Flagship Cruises, the court held that "confining protestors
to their stated reasons is limited to situations where the statements may have misled
drawers, who could have remedied defects but relied on the statement ... to their
injury." Id.; accord Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank, Int'l, 608
F.2d 43, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1979); Wing On Bank, Ltd. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 457 F.2d 328, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace
Co., 583 S.W.2d 852, 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); see Chase Manhattan Bank v.
Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1977) (court denies summary judgment due to
material question of fact concerning the beneficiary's ability to prove detrimental
reliance when only three hours remained to cure performance under the letter).
168. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs., 634 P.2d 32, 41 (Colo.
1981) (en banc). The Colorado Supreme Court held that "[t]he [beneficiary] could
not have cured the defect since the presentment would have then been untimely.
Consequently, the [beneficiary] did not detrimentally rely on the Bank's failure to
state as one ground for its dishonor of the drafts that the [beneficiary] presented
demand instruments rather than fifteen-day sight drafts." Id. (citations omitted):
accord Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699,
703-04 (1st Cir. 1978); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 887 (3d
Cir. 1977).
169. 481 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
170. Id. at 1237. The court held that "§ 5-102(3) provides an adequate source for
the conclusion that [the] rule of waiver may be applied in appropriate cases." Id.
Additionally, U.C.C. § 5-104 official comment 1 (1977) states that "[q]uestions of
mistake, waiver or estoppel are left to supplementary principles of law." Id.
171. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 218
F.2d 831, 840-41 (10th Cir. 1955); see United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank, N.A.,
469 F. Supp. 473, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Hyland Hills Metro. Park & Recreational
Dist. v. McCoy Enters., Inc., 3§ Colo. App. 23, 26, 554 P.2d 708, 710 (1976): Banco
Tornquist, S.A. v. American Bank & Trust Co., 71 Misc. 2d 874, 874-75, 337
N.Y.S.2d 489, 489-90 (1972).
172. See Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d
699, 703-04 (1st Cir. 1978); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 887
(3d Cir. 1977); Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1237
(5th Cir. 1973); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 634 P.2d 32, 11.
42 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co., 583 S.W.2d 852, 862 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979).
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An equitable approach to a strict compliance standard demands that
the issuer promptly communicate all documentary defects to the bene-
ficiary, when time exists under the letter to remedy the nonconform-
ity. 7 3 An obligation to invite cure of minor deficiencies in the benefi-
ciary's draft would ameliorate the burden imposed by the strict
compliance standard.
The drafters of Article 5, however, did not impose an affirmative
obligation upon the issuer to inform the beneficiary of deficiencies in
his documentary presentment. Section 5-112 merely provides that
issuer honor or dishonor must be determined by "the close of the third
baiking day following receipt of the documents" 74 or a later date if
the beneficiary so consents.17 5  Failure to honor within this time
period will be held to constitute dishonor of the draft. 7 1 At no point
in the letter transaction, therefore, is the issuer expressly obligated to
communicate the status of the letter to the beneficiary.
It could be argued that the good faith standard implied in all Code-
governed transactions 7 7 already obligates the issuer to inform the
beneficiary of any deficiency that could be remedied before the ex-
piration of the letter. Non-communication of a curable defect would
not seem to comport with the "honesty in fact" required by the
Code.178 No court has yet adopted this particular application of the
good faith standard. Although by use of estoppel courts are creating a
duty to inform the beneficiary of documentary non-compliance when
time exists to cure, 9 an express standard would promote the efficacy
of the letter of credit.
Though absent under the Code, express provision is made in the
UCP for an issuer obligation to notify the beneficiary of any claim of
non-conformity. Article 8 provides that if dishonor "'is to be made,
notice to that effect, stating the reasons therefore, must, without
delay, be given by cable."'180 By requiring the issuer to promptly
specify its reasons for dishonor, the UCP implicitly invites cure of any
alleged deficiencies.' 8' Many letters of credit provide for the applica-
bility of the UCP,I62 and courts in such cases should recognize the
issuer obligation required therein. The doctrine of strict compliance
173. See U.C.P. art. 8(e) (1974); cases cited supra note 165.
174. U.C.C. § 5-112(1)(a) (1977).
175. Id. § 5-112(1)(b).
176. Id. § 5-112(1).
177. Id. § 1-203.
178. Id. § 1-201(19).
179. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
180. U.C.P. art. 8(e) (1974).
181. See Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d
699, 703 (1st Cir. 1978) (dictum).
182. H. Harfield II, supra note 1, at 3; T. Quinn, Uniform Commercial Code
Commentary and Law Digest 5-101[A][1][a] (1978); J. White & R. Summers,
supra note 6, § 18-3, at 717.
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demands that the beneficiary precisely fulfill his obligations under the
letter of credit; quite properly, the issuer should be required to func-
tion on the same level.
2. Customer Waiver: Excusing Defective
Performance After Expiration of the Letter
When the time for performance of a letter of credit has expired, a
strict compliance standard would preclude a beneficiary from curing
any non-conformity, even those de minimus in nature. 8 3 One ap-
proach to this problem would be to require the issuer to seek a waiver
of such defects from the customer.' 84  If the customer waives the
documentary variance, the issuer would be obligated to honor the
draft as if strict compliance had been originally realized upon present-
ment. 185 Should the customer, for whatever reason, insist on literal
enforcement of the letter's requirements, the issuer would dishonor
the letter leaving the beneficiary to his rights in the underlying trans-
action.' 86  If the beneficiary initiates an action for issuer wrongful
dishonor, summary judgment should be granted in the issuer's fa-
vor.18 7 This disposition could be conditioned on the issuer's produc-
183. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
184. Requiring customer waiver is not a radical deviation from current letter of
credit practice. Some courts already condition honor of less than strictly complying
drafts upon customer waiver of the non-conformity. Corporacion de Mercadeo Agri-
cola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1979); Courtaulds N. Am.,
Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 808-07 (4th Cir. 1975); Interna.
tional Leather Distribs., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 464 F. Supp. 1197, 1201
(S.D.N.Y.), aJ'd mem., 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979); North Am. Foreign Trading
Corp. v. General Elecs., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d 890, 891-92, 413 N.Y.S.2d 700, 702 (1979)
(mem.); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-6, at 732-33; see Chairmasters,
Inc. v. Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 283 A.D. 704, 704-05, 127 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807
(1954) (per curiam); H. Harfield I, supra note 1, at 105. In fact an international
survey conducted by Boris Kozolchyk found that "[a]bout 20 per cent of the [issuers
responding] to the Questionaire indicated that they consulted their customers to
determine whether to accept irregularities." Kozolehyk, supra note 1, at 81 & n.451.
185. See Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802,
807 (4th Cir. 1975); International Leather Distribs. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 464
F. Supp. 1197, 1201-03 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd, 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979); North Am.
Foreign Trading Corp. v. General Elecs., Ltd., 67 A.D.2d 890, 891, 413 N.Y.S.2d
700, 702 (1979) (mem.).
186. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 18-6, at 728; see, e.g., Corporacion
de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1979); Sisalcords
Do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasileria de Sisal, S.A., 450 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972); Far E. Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 430 F. Supp. 193, 195-96 (S.D. Ohio 1977); cf. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (customer right
to sue on the underlying transaction if the goods delivered are non-conforming).
187. West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1110 (W.D.
Pa. 1976). "Liability on the letter of credit presents solely legal issues and thus can be
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tion of an affidavit reflecting the customer's refusal to waive the non-
compliance. In effect, absent customer waiver, dishonor due to less
than strict compliance wvill extinguish all of the issuer's obligations
under the letter of credit.1rs
Under present law, however, a customer has no good faith obliga-
tion to waive an immaterial deficiency in a beneficiary's documentary
draft. Unfortunately, customers have a propensity to find deviations
in the documentary presentment when a sharp decline in the market
price of the goods purchased occurs, or when the customer becomes
insolvent. 8 9 At least one defect in a draft can usually be isolated by a
thorough examination. 90 To eliminate this possible abuse of the
strict compliance standard, it is proposed that a provision be added to
Article 5 to confer a remedy upon the beneficiary in cases of bad faith
customer refusal to waive insignificant terms of the letter of credit.
When litigating the underlying contract, the beneficiary could then
raise this provision as a preliminary matter for adjudication, and if
this claim were substantiated, it would be determinative in an action
for the price. Although every contract or credit under the Code con-
tains an implied good faith obligation,'"' a bad faith waiver provision
would ensure court acknowledgement and control of the possible
abuses inherent in the doctrine of strict compliance.
CONCLUSION
The right to enforce absolutely the express terms and conditions of a
letter of credit, without reference to the equities of a particular case,
has long been recognized as essential to the utility of this financial
instrument. When parties provide for a letter of credit, their mutual
disposed of by the court on a motion for summary judgment." Id. (emphasis in
original); see, e.g., Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d
1077, 1078 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l
Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 414 U.S. 1139 (1974);
Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1970); Dulien
Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836, 837 (2d Cir. 1962): Beathard
v. Chicago Football Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (mem.); cj.
Dovenmuehle, Inc. v. East Bank, 563 P.2d 24, 27 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (evidence
offered by issuer to prove the intent of the parties to the letter of credit was ex-
cluded), aft'd, 196 Colo. 422, 589 P.2d 1361 (1978) (en banc). But see Chase
Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1977) (denial of summary
judgment where detrimental reliance upon an issuer waiver was a material question
of fact).
188. Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 47.48
& n.1 (2d Cir. 1979): see supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
189. Kozolchyk, supra note 1, at 82.
190. 1 A. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, § 5.55(d), at 106 (citing G. Gilmore & C.
Black, supra note 56, at 120); accord State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra
note 85, at 66-67, reprinted in 1955 Report, supra note 85, at 1634-35.
191. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977).
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intention is to limit the risks of their transaction by channelling per-
formance through an independent third party. It is inconsistent with
the expectations of the parties and the proper functioning of the letter
to inject discretion into the issuer's performance. The importance of
the traditional strict compliance standard to letter of credit law has
not been obviated by the passage of time or the introduction of
equitable considerations into commercial law. "Just as good" is still
just not good enough.
Letter of credit law, of course, should not ignore either the frailties
of human nature or the realities of the market place. By allowing
issuers or customers to defeat a letter on the basis of trival defects, a
standard of strict compliance will, perforce, breed the controversies it
is designed to avoid. A solution to the problem of minor documentary
non-compliance, however, can be achieved within the confines of the
traditional strict compliance standard. By imposing affirmative obli-
gations on all three parties to the letter transaction, minor deviations
can be cured by the beneficiary or excused by the customer so as to
facilitate the proper functioning of the letter of credit mechanism. By
adopting this approach, courts can reduce the litigation in this area
and provide the financial community with a standard under which
letters of credit can flourish.
Jonathan D. Thier
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